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Abstract
This Essay analyzes the effectiveness of television broadcasting regulations as a means to
effectuate the promotion and protection of a pan-European culture, namely, television broadcasting
regulations. First, in Part I, this Essay considers the broader background developments in the
audio-visual sector that led to the passing of the Directive. Part II looks at the advantages and
disadvantages of the most controversial aspect of the Directive, namely, the quota provisions.
Part III critiques the Directive’s effectiveness in realizing its dual goals of both protecting and
promoting a pan-European culture. Finally, Part IV compares the goals enunciated in the Federal
Communications Act (”FCC Act”) with those enunciated in the Directive. Both sets of goals
reflect similar concerns and interests, although the United States takes a much broader approach in
realizing its goals. This Essay concludes that the Community should, like the United States, take
a more expansive approach to its audio-visual policy, similar to the approach reflected in the FCC
Act, in order to strengthen and effectuate a more solid and unified European broadcast regulatory
scheme that both protects and promotes a European culture.
HOW WOULD YOU LIKE YOUR TELEVISION:
WITH OR WITHOUT BORDERS AND WITH
OR WITHOUT CULTURE-A NEW
APPROACH TO MEDIA REGULATION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Kevin M. McDonald*
Movies, for us [Europeans], are not only products and mer-
chandise, but also works that express our culture and our
models.'
Jack Lang, Ex-French Minister of Culture
TV is only about... ratings and profit.'
Michael Solomon, Warner Brothers Corp.
INTRODUCTION
One of the more controversial Directives passed by the Eu-
ropean Community ("EC") is the "Television Without Frontiers"
broadcasting directive ("Directive").' Article 4 of the Directive
has received considerable criticism for its quota provision, which
calls for running at least fifty-one percent of television program-
ming from EC sources.4 Despite amendments passed in 1997 to
the 1989 directive, the quota provision was retained. Numerous
observers have criticized the 1989 directive as being in violation
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs5 ("GATT") prin-
ciples such as the ban on quantitative restrictions. What many of
these critics have failed to consider, however, is a- broader per-
spective on the Directive, namely, just how the Directive fits into
* Associate, H6lters & Elsing, Dfisseldorf/Germany. Attorney-at-Law (Illinois and
Washington D.C.) and Rechtsbeistand ffir US-amerikanisches Recht & Volkerrecht
(Higher Regional Court, Dfisseldorf). Currently doctoral and LL.M. Eur. candidate at
the Europa-Institut at the University of the Saarland in Saarbrficken, Germany.
1. See Laurence G.C. Kaplan, Comment, The European Community's "Television With-
out Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255,
346 n.406 (1994) (citing Beinex: "La culture ne se negocie pas," LiBERATION, May 14,
1993, at 5).
2. See Ken Auletta, Television's New Gold Rush, NEw YORKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 88.
3. Council Directive No. 89/552, O.J. L 298/23 (1989) [hereinafter Directive].
4. Id. art. 4 O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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the European Community's overall approach to regulating the
audio-visual industry. Specifically, U.S. critics of the quota have
failed to consider that the Directive's major purposes, i.e., the
protection and promotion of a pan-European culture, are based
on an entirely different concept of the role television plays in
European society than it does in the United States.
This Essay analyzes the effectiveness of television broadcast-
ing regulations as a means to effectuate the promotion and pro-
tection of a pan-European culture, namely, television broadcast-
ing regulations. First, in Part I, this Essay considers the broader
background developments in the audio-visual sector that led to
the passing of the Directive. Part II looks at the advantages and
disadvantages of the most controversial aspect of the Directive,
namely, the quota provisions. Part III critiques the Directive's
effectiveness in realizing its dual goals of both protecting and
promoting a pan-European culture. Finally, Part IV compares
the goals enunciated in the Federal Communications Act 6 ("FCC
Act") with those enunciated in the Directive. Both sets of goals
reflect similar concerns and interests, although the United States
takes a much broader approach in realizing its goals. This Essay
concludes that the Community should, like the United States,
take a more expansive approach to its audio-visual policy, similar
to the approach reflected in the FCC Act, in order to strengthen
and effectuate a more solid and unified European broadcast reg-
ulatory scheme that both protects and promotes a European cul-
ture.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Twentieth-Century Revolutions in the Audio-Visual Industry and
State Responses7
1. The Roots of Audio-Visual Regulation
Government regulation of television content has existed in
6. See Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
7. For an excellent discussion on the early interventionist tradition of European
state involvement in the realm of audio-visual communications (as far back as the
1500s), see Kaplan, supra note 1, at 260 (stating that "[t]he European state has always
been interested in controlling information"). Kaplan suggests that European state
involvement in audio-visual communications is based on two interventionist traditions:
(1) regulation of telecommunications, which began as early as the sixteenth century
with the establishment of state postal monopolies; and (2) state regulation of printed
publications, Id. at 260.
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Europe since the 1930s. Even before televisions became com-
monplace, governments were concerned with the effects of for-
eign broadcasts, albeit radio broadcasts, on their people. Per-
haps no other example of regulation best reflects this concern
than the International Convention Concerning the Use of
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace' ("Convention"). The Con-
vention was signed in 1936 upon the urging of the League of
Nations. The Convention's main purpose was to regulate, and
even to prohibit, state radio broadcasts in one country that were
received in another country and might upset the internal secur-
ity of the receiving country.' The signatories to the Convention
recognized the need for "preventing, by means of rules [an-
nounced in the Convention], broadcasting from being used in a
manner prejudicial to good international understanding. '" 10
Thus, as early as the 1930's, European countries had expressly
recognized the need to control the power of broadcasting
through international agreements.
2. Post-World War II Revolutions and Responses in the
Audio-Visual Industry
After World War II, the audio-visual market in Europe de-
veloped on the domestic, rather than on the international, scale.
By the early 1970's, television growth and technological develop-
ment resulted in a viewing population of no longer thousands,
8. International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S 301 [hereinafter Convention].
9. Id. Article 1 of the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcast-
ing in the Cause of Peace ("Convention") in pertinent part states that
[the Parties] mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop
without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any trans-
mission which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such
a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible
with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting
Party.
Id. art. 1. The following European states were signatories of the treaty: Albania, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom, and (then) Czechoslovakia. Turkey and Russia also signed this Convention, but
the author leaves it to the reader whether these countries should be included under the
rubric of "European" signatories.
10. Id. pmbl. The Preamble of the Convention also notes the signatories' "desire
to utilize, by the application of the [Convention's] rules, the possibilities offered by
[radio broadcasts] for promoting better mutual understanding between peoples." Id.
1999] 1993
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but millions.11 France was the first European country to respond
officially to this new form of broadcasting by proposing a set of
principles for regulating direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") -to the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space Working
Group on DBS. 1 2 As early as 1972, some, if not many, European
countries also voiced concerns about the impact of "spillover," a
euphemism for foreign programs and culture.13
As the popularity of DBS rose in the late 1970s and early
1980s, European officials increasingly expressed concern over
the potential harmful effects that thisnew form of communica-
tion might have on the international and domestic audio-visual
landscapes. One commentator argued that these concerns re-
flected the fear of three undesirable effects: de-stabilization of
the media, lower quality of programs, and most importantly
"domination of the screen by programs of American origin, to the
detriment of the authentic cultural programs of European countries." 4
In April 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted a
memorandum to the Committee of the Ministers of the Council
of Europe that expressed concerns about the weakening of the
intellectual and cultural plurality of Europe.15 In July 1982,
11. See generally John P.L. Roberts, The Implications of the Globalization of Television
and Its Cultures, 15 COMM. 213 (1990). Today, the global scope of the audio-visual me-
dia is illustrated by the term "mediasphere." "Mediasphere" refers to the continuous,
innate connections between the broadcasters and the viewer (target) audience.
"Mediasphere" is a living body, whose skeleton is the technology and hardware, whose
connective ligaments are cables and satellites, and whose tissue is programs and profes-
sionals. Id. at 223.
12. Proposed Principles to Govern Direct Broadcasts from Communications Satel-
lites, reprinted in K. QUEENY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
241-44 (1978), quoted in Steven Ruth, The Regulation of Spillover Transmission from the
Direct Broadcast Satellites in Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107, 117 (1989). The proposal
identified several types of programs that the French felt should not be broadcast with-
out the recipient-state's consent: (1) programs that specifically interfere with the inter-
nal affairs of foreign states; (2) propaganda prejudicial to international or internal
peace; (3) attacks on the dignity or rights of the individual; (4) material offensive to the
audience's moral, religious, philosophical, or political sensibilities (e.g., pornography);
(5) material harmful to children (e.g., excessive violence); and finally, most relevant to
the issues surrounding the "Television without Frontiers" Directive, (6) material disre-
spectful of the cultures within the area of transmission or tending to destroy civilizations, cultures,
religions, or traditions. Id.
13. See Steven Ruth, The Regulation of Spillover Transmission from the Direct Broadcast
Satellites in Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107,117-18 (1989).
14. See Fritz W. Hondius, European Principles on the Use of Satellites/or Television and
Sound Radio, 10 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 367, 371 (1985).
15. Id.
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France convened an intergovernmental conference in Paris for
the purpose of drafting an agreement with its fellow EC Member
States to "thwart the risk of DBS transmissions crushing the cul-
tural identities of receiving countries with a flood of low quality
and mostly non-European programs."16
'Finally, in addition to the technological revolutions, e.g.,
DBS, that took hold in the European audio-visual industry, the
most significant non-technological revolution occurring in the
European audio-visual industry during the 1970s and 1980s was
the industry's increasing inability to compete with Hollywood for
programming. What was the explanation for U.S. dominance?
First, English was the most widely spoken second language in
Europe. 17 Thus, the language barrier facing producers from
countries with other languages, such as Spanish or German,
proved relatively easy to overcome for English-speaking Ameri-
cans. Second, Hollywood possesses the largest and most expen-
sive pool of creative talent, which has access to the world's most
extensive technical facilities in which to work. In addition, ac-
cess to higher budgets translated into big stars, stunning sets and
locations, special effects, and strong writing and producing tal-
ent."' Lastly, U.S. studios and.production companies benefited
from the world's most extensive film and television archives,
complemented by powerful marketing and distribution systems
that placed films in both theaters and on the air all over the
world. 9 To summarize, Hollywood dominates Europe because
"American shows are cheap, top quality, and breach the lan-
guage barrier."20
16. Id. France went a step further by tightening its domestic laws on direct broad-
cast satellite ("DBS"). Title III, Article 11 of the January 18, 1989 French law on audio-
visual media broadly defined one of the "missions", i.e., legal obligations, of French
television networks, namely to include the broadcast of programs "during prime time
viewing, cinematographic and audio-visual works, a majority of which shall be original
French works and original works from the European Community." See Kaplan, supra
note 1, at 266 n.35 (citing Lol DU 17 JANVIER 1989 SUR LA LIBERTE DE COMMUNICATION
art. 11 (.0.) (D.S.L.)) (emphasis added). -
17. This fact is of great significance because few of the Member States share the
same first language. Recent statistics indicate that 50% of the citizens in the Commu-'
nity can speak English, either as the mother language or as a second language, in com-
parison to 15% for French and 9% for German. See Die Holfe der Europa erkannEnglisch,
DEUTSCHLAND NACHR1CHTEN, Jan. 17, 1997, at 7.
18. See Richard W. Stevenson, Hollywood Takes to the Global Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1989, at Cl.
19. Id.
20. See Steven Greenhouse, The Media Business: For Europe, U.S. May Spell TV, N.Y.
1999] 1995
1996 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNTAL [Vol. 22:1991
B. EC Responses
The Community considers the development of a European
film and television program industry that is both globally com-
petitive and capable of radiating the influence of European cul-
ture of utmost importance. The Community aims to encourage
development within the industry both by removing internal bar-
riers and by promoting the production and distribution of Euro-
pean programs. The "Television Without Frontiers" directive
harmonizes national legislation and establishes the general
framework of free movement of television broadcast services e.g.,
rules concerning advertising, protection of minors, right of re-
ply, promotion of the production, and distribution of programs,
etc.
1. EC Jurisdiction Generally
The European Economic Community21 was founded in
1951, following World War II, in an effort by the Europeans both
to rebuild the steel and coal industries and to regain control
over their own destiny by diminishing the Soviet menace and
reducing their dependence on the United States. 22 In 1957, the
Treaty of Rome 21 ("EEC Treaty") officially established the Euro-
pean Economic Community to organize a single market among
the Member States and to allow the free flow of goods, services,
TIMESJuly 31, 1989, at Dl. For example, European broadcasting executives can usually
purchase the rights to broadcast an hour-long American program for less than one-
tenth of what it would cost to finance the production of a new, hour-long domestic
program. Id.
21. On November 1, 1993, the former European Economic Community ("EEC")
became known as the European Community ("EC" or "Community"). See Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinaf-
ter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]).
22. See generally GEORGE A. BERMANN FT AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw (1993); PETRUS MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
(5th ed. 1990); FRANCIS SNYDER, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1990);
D. VAUGHN, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1986);J. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991); see also Leo Flynn, Telecommunications and European
Integration, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 217, 218 (Jo Shaw & Gil-
lian More eds., 1995) (discussing political science accounts of policy development and
implementation in Community over three decades in terms of several distinct models:
proto-federation; international regime; and concordance system).
23. EEC Treaty, supra note 21.
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and persons.24
2. EC Jurisdiction over Broadcasting
25
The Community's competence to act in the field of broad-
casting within the scope of the EEC Treaty was recognized by the
European Court of Justice 26 (or "Court") in 1974. The Court
stated that
[i] n the absence of [any] express provision to the contrary in
the Treaty, a television signal must, by reason of its nature, be
regarded as a provision of services . .. it follows that the
transmission of television signals, including those in nature of




25. As used in this Essay, the term "broadcasting" means any transmission or re-
transmission, either by (1) conventional television antenna, wire, or cable, or (2)
satellite, encoded or unencoded, or television programs intended for reception by the
public, or intended for rebroadcast to the public. It does not include communication
services providing information on individual demand, such as telecopying, data banks,
or cellular radio.
26. See id. art. 164, at 73. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") functions as the
judicial body that adjudicates disputes arising under the Community Treaties. Id.
Although the ECJ's jurisdiction varies widely, its powers are precisely limited by the
Treaty. Id.
27. See Sacchi, Case 155/73, [1974] E.C.R. 409, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177; see also
Procureur Du Roi v. Debauve, Case 52/79, [1980] E.C.R. 833, [2982] 2 C.M.L.R. 362
(upholding decision in Sacchi that broadcasting of television signals, including those in
nature of advertisements, comes, as such, within rules of EEC Treaty relating to services
and further, that there is no reason to treat transmission of such signals by cable televi-
sion any differently). In addition, the Commission, as stated in its green paper on the
subject, see infra text accompanying notes 39-44, has argued that broadcasting is not
only a service, but also an activity carried on by self-employed persons (broadcasters)
for remuneration. Thus, under the EEC Treaty, restrictions on the freedom to broad-
cast in the European Union must be removed, and free movement across borders those
services ensured. See AUDREY WINTER ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERs: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE 259 (1989). The designation as a service as opposed to a good is critical, when one
considers the uproar from many U.S. observers who argue that the Directive's quota
provisions violate the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT"). Whereas the
GATT covers trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade and Services ("GATS")
covers trade in services. Surprisingly, little literature analyzes GATS implications; pre-
sumably the critics of the Directive, in their haste to label the Directive as a breach of
the GATT, have overlooked any GATS implications. In any case, a discussion of GATS is
far beyond the scope of this Essay. Whether the Directive violates prohibited GATI
practices under Articles I and III turns largely on the characterization of television
broadcasting as either a good or a service. Because the European Union has always
recognized television broadcasting as a service, it argues that the Directive does not fall
under GATT. The United States, by contrast, rejects the European Union's view and
characterizes television programming as goods; thus, the Directive's quotas are GATT-
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The EEC Treaty gives the EC jurisdiction to regulate the broad-
casting industry.28 Furthermore, broadcasting activities are con-
sidered part of "cultural life."'29 Thus, the Community may exer-
cise jurisdiction over those elements of "cultural life" affected by
broadcasting.3 °
3. Historical Background of the "Television Without
Frontiers" Directive
a. Material for a European Media Concept-1980
Concerned about the effects of changing technology on
both the European culture and broadcasting industry, the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe established a com-
mittee of government-appointed experts in 1976 to examine a
series of questions relating to the audio-visual media in the
Member States of the Community.3 ' The Committee on the
Mass Media ("CAHMM") spent four years researching media
trends and issues, which it presented to the Council in 1980 in
illegal. See 135 CONG. REc. H7327 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. Gib-
bons). Other countries recognize that the transmission of television programs is a ser-
vice, not a good. See Timothy M. Lupinacci, Note, The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting
Activities in the European Community: Cultural Preservation or Economic Protectionism, 24
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 135 (1991) (explaining that British law recognizes that
transmission of television programs is service). Even if the terms of the Directive do not
violate GATT, the United States has the option to apply unilateral sanctions against the
European Union pursuant to Section 301 (though whether the unilateral application of
Section 301 would itself violate GATT is another question beyond the scope of this
Essay). For an excellent discussion of potential U.S. responses to the Directive, see Paul
Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created
by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L COMP. L. REV. 495, 506-09
(1990).
28. See EEC Treaty, supra note 21. Many U.S. experts argue that the creation of
standard regulation will provide additional development of European Union markets.
Other U.S. experts argue that the European Union will only create additional barriers
in an attempt to frustrate foreign competition. See Jamie Sheldon, Comment, "Televi-
sion Without Frontiers:" A Case Study of Turner Broadcasting's New Channel in the Commu-
nity-Does It Violate the Directive?, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. 523, 526 n.31-32 (1994).
29. See Rebecca Wallace & David Goldberg, EEC Directive on Television Broadcasting,
in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw: 1989, at 192 (A. Barav & D.A. Wyatt eds.,
1990) [hereinafter Wallace & Goldberg].
30. Id.
31. Committee on the Mass Media for a European Media Concept: Reports Sub-
mitted to the Committee of Ministers (1980) [hereinafter Material for a European Me-
dia Concept]. For an excellent discussion of the Committee on the Mass Media
("CAHMM"), see Lucien J. Dhooge, No Place for Melrose: Channelsurfing, Human Rights,
and the European Community's "Television Without Frontiers"Directive, 16 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 279, 289 (1996).
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the form of a report ("Report").3 CAHMM concluded, to the
surprise of many European observers, that the state's proper role
did not include content regulation,33 but rather, the encourage-
ment of a plurality of information sources to serve the general
public.3 4 Why? CAHMM reasoned first that the freedom and
autonomy of the mass media are essential elements of a demo-
cratic and pluralist society, "indeed as among the pillars of a so-
cial and political order safeguarding the liberty of the individ-
ual."35 Second, the public is best served by a media that is "free
and autonomous, politically and culturally varied, [thus] in a po-
sition to offer citizens the choice of a wide variety of sources of
information and a multiplicity of ideas and opinions thereby [in-
creasing the citizens'] possibility to better participate in public
affairs."36 Surprisingly, U.S. lobbyists who fought against passage
of the Directive failed to use the CAHMM Report as evidence of
an earlier EC policy against broad-based broadcasting regula-
tions and thus inconsistent with the purposes announced in the
Directive.37
b. Commission's Green Paper-1984
CAHMM's conclusions fell on deaf ears. In May 1984, the
Commission of .the European Communities ("Commission") is-
sued the influential Green Paper on the Establishment of the
Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and
Cable ("Green Paper") .38 The Commission intended the Green
Paper to serve as a basis for harmonizing the national laws of
television broadcasting among Member States. One of the
means recommended to effectuate this end was the imposition
of a quota upon television programming originating from within
the Community.39 The proposed quota recommended that
32. Id. Some of these issues became the focus of the "Television Without Fron-
tiers" Directive.
33. Material for a European Media Concept, supra note 31, at 6, § 1.
34. Id. at 6, § 3.
35. Id. at 8, § 1.
36. Id.
37. Granted, the CAHMM report itself was inconsistent with the long-standing Eu-
ropean policy to regulate broadcasts actively. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text
(discussing tradition under Convention).
38. Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Com-
mon Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM (84) 300 Final
(June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Green Paper].
39. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions
1999] 1999
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thirty percent of broadcasting time be reserved for program-
ming originating from the Community-to increase gradually to
sixty percent by December 1992.4o In addition, the Commission
argued that cross-border transmissions would be "a source of cul-
tural enrichment,"41 would provide the impetus for increased
technical innovation in Europe in transmission media,4 2 and
would prevent the "dominance of the big American media cor-
porations."43 Many, but not all, Member States welcomed the
Green Paper as a success.44
c. European Convention on Trans-frontier Broadcasting-1989
On the heels of the Green Paper came the European Con-
vention on Trans-frontier Television45 ("Television Conven-
tion"), the immediate legislative and political precursor to the
"Television Without Frontiers" Directive. In March 1989, nu-
merous European states in the Council of Europe, including
many EC Member States,4 6 ratified the Television Convention,
which obligated the signatories to "ensure, where practicable
and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for Euro-
pean works a majority of their transmission time."4 This lan-
guage mirrors the language chosen by the drafters in the Pream-
Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning
the Pursuit of Broadcasting Activities, OJ. C 179/4 (1986) [hereinafter Proposed Direc-
tive].
40. Id. art. 2, OJ. C 179/4, at 7 (1986) (exempting news, sporting events, game
shows, advertising, and teletext services from proposed quota).
41. Green Paper, supra note 38, COM (84) 300 Final at 30.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at 33.
44. The Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark, after originally supporting
the quota provisions, later opposed its adoption. These two states did not disapprove
on economic or industrial grounds, nor on the adoption of a quota per se. Rather,
opposition rested on the broad moral issue of cultural control. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 120-24. For a similar rationale opposing broadcast regulations, see supra
notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing CAHMM).
45. European Convention on Trans-frontier Television, May 5, 1989, Europ. T.S.
No. 132 [hereinafter Television Convention].
46. The European Convention on Trans-frontier Television ("Television Conven-
tion"), adopted on March 15, 1989, just six months before ratification of the Directive,
was signed by 24 members of the Council of Europe. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 279.
47. Television Convention, supra note 45, art. 10(1), at 247 (exempting, as did
Green Paper, time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, and teletext
services from proposed quota). Article 10, entitled "Cultural Objectives," set forth argu-
ments familiar to the debate over cultural protectionism. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at
279.
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ble and in Article 3 of the Directive."8 The Convention called
for a gradual progressive application of the broadcast quotas and
transmission times. 4
9
d. Charter of Delphes-1989
Also on the heels of the Green Paper came the Charter of
Delphes ("Charter") in September 1989, a document formulated
by the European artistic, scientific, and academic communities
in unanimous support of programming quotas. ° Though non-
binding, the Charter was the intellectual and civilian rally-cry for
the Directive. The Charter began with the premise that televi-
sion was the dominant form of mass media and the most influen-
tial element of modern culture.5 1 Moreover, the television pro-
gram was both "an essential expression of culture '5 2 and a reflec-
tion of the social and cultural values and characteristics of the
broadcasting country. Lamenting the "cultural crisis" in the
European audio-visual sector, the Charter set forth a five-step
plan 5 4 that ended with a desperate cry to Brussels: "Therefore,
the integrity, and indeed the future of our cinemas and our tele-
visions is your responsibility .... This is a fight for human devel-
opment and for democracy. May the governments fight with
US! "
55
48. See Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989).
49. Id.
50. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 286 (citing Incantation de Delphes, Charte Er-
opeene de la creation audiovisuelle, Sept. 25-27, 1988, reprinted in part in DossIERs DE
L'AUDIOVISUEL, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 53).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 286-87.
54. The Preamble of the Charter of Delphes ("Charter") consisted of five basic
principles and a conclusion or demand. First, the drafters declared television the most
influential element of modern culture because of its universal and nearly omnipresent
nature. Second, the drafters defined "culture" to include both the public's freedom of
choice and the rights of artists and creators to express themselves free of constraint.
Third, these two rights (freedom of choice and freedom from constraint) are often
denied by economic forces, who often use the media as tools of power and control.
Fourth, the institutions in society not only must safeguard but also must impose duties
and responsibilities on the media to promote a real and true free circulation of ideas,
information, and creations. Fifth, and finally, the drafters found that censorship, inter-
ference, and political and commercial manipulations were themselves menaces to soci-
ety. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 281-82 (citing Incantation de Delphes, Charte
europeene de la creation audiovisuelle, Sept. 25-27, 1988, reprinted in part in DossIERs
DE L'AUDIOVISUEL, Jan.-Feb. 1991); see also Dhooge, supra note 31, at 294-95.
55. Id. The Charter imposes on every European state the duty of protecting this
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II. STATEMENT OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE NO. 89/552:
"TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS"
A. Procedural and Legislative History
On April 30, 1986, the European Community's Council of
Ministers ("Council") first proposed a directive ("Council's Pro-
posal") to regulate broadcasting within the Community.56 After
four years of preparation and months of pre-ratification debate,
the Council finally approved the "Television Without Frontiers"
Directive by a vote of 10 to 2."
On April 13, 1989, the EC trade ministers sent the approved
broadcast directive to the European Parliament.58 Debate and
controversy surrounding the proposed Directive ignited in the
European Parliament, as members of the European film industry
urged Parliament either to strengthen the Directive by imposing
rigid quotas on non-European programs or abandon the pro-
posed Directive altogether.59 Carla Hills, then U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR".), sent a letter to each member of the Euro-
pean Parliament explaining the U.S. position that passage of the
proposed Directive's local content quota requirement would vio-
late GATT.6 ° In May 1989, the Parliament agreed on a Directive
that required television stations to broadcast a minimum of
50.1% of European programs by 1993.61
The Commission and Parliament finally sent their agreed
upon directive and its 50.1% quota clause to the Council of Min-
isters in Fall 1989. Not surprisingly, the controversy and debate
continued between those who supported protecting Europe's
expression of European culture through all available means, including subsidies and
programming quotas. Id.
56. Proposed Directive, supra note 39, Oj. C 179/4 (1986). Note that this propo-
sal called for broadcasters to reserve "only" thirty percent of their broadcast time for
European works, not including news, sporting events, game shows, advertising, and
teletext services.
57. Only Belgium and Denmark voted against the measure.
58. See generally Suzanne Michele Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?, 16 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 351, 352-54 (1991).
59. Id. at 352. Moreover, European cultural personalities also urged the Parlia-
ment to defeat the Directive unless strict quotas on non-European programs were in-
cluded. Id.
60. Id. The United States claimed that passage would violate both the Most Fa-
vored Nation provision in Article I and the National Treatment provision of Article III.
For an in-depth discussion of the U.S. position, see generally Lupinacci, supra note 27, at
135; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 27.
61. See Schwarz, supra note 58, at 353.
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culture and tradition and those who feared the negative ramifi-
cations of a quota on the industry.6 2 After initially rejecting the
proposed directive altogether,63 the Council reversed its position
and on October 3, 1989,64 agreed on a diluted and ambiguous
version. The Federal Republic of Germany, after initially voting
against the proposed directive, supported the diluted version af-
ter officially declaring that Articles 4 and 5 are merely "political
obligations."65
Ironically, many EC insiders have fingered the United
States' anti-quota lobbying as a main reason for passage of the
Directive. David Webster, a former BBC director and U.S. based
media consultant, argued that "[t] he American pressure [was] of
such a nature that it ... irritated most European countries. It
may have persuaded the French that the Directive [was] a good
idea after all, because if it annoys the Americans that much, [it]
must be good. ' 6 6 After final passage of the Directive, one EC
spokesman summarized the battle for passage as follows: "We
have a Directive today,. thanks to the Americans. '"67
B. Scope and Purpose of the Directive
The primary purpose of the Directive is to permit television
broadcasts that comply with the Directive's requirements to be
received and re-transmitted freely in all Member States.6 The
62. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 284.
63. France, the Netherlands, and Greece resisted approving the plan because the
language of "where practicable the European Community should require the majority
of programs to be from Europe" was insufficient protection for European productions.
See Schwarz, supra note 58, at 353. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany ques-
tioned whether the rules encroached their national responsibilities. Id. Finally, other
countries opposed any binding limit on imports. Id.
64. As a side note, the Berlin Wall "fell" (was opened) just five weeks later, on
November 9, 1989.
65. See Schwarz, supra note 58, at 353.
66. See Aggressive U.S. Stance on Quotas May Have Hurt More than Helped, VAIETY,
Oct. 4-10, 1989, at 2.
67. See EC Adopts Quota Directive: To Take Effect in 18 Months, VARIETY, Oct. 4-10,
1989, at 1.
68. The disparity on matters such as producing and distributing programs, adver-
tising and sponsorship, and the proteciion of children restrict the free movement of
broadcasts. Thus, the Council adopted the Directive, inter alia, to coordinate national
laws concerning television broadcasting. The Directive calls on Member States to en-
sure freedom of reception and re-transmission of television broadcasts from other
Member States. See generally MARK BREALEY & CONER QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTER-
NAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY- 1992 HANDBOOK 210 (1991)..
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Directive lays down the rules necessary to provide the minimum
protection for the maintenance of the different interests in-
volved, while leaving Member States free to impose stricter or
more detailed requirements on broadcasts originating in their
own territories.69 The Directive seeks to realize the free move-
ment of television broadcasting activity as a service under Article
60 of the EEC Treaty.70
The Directive, however, has a more overarching purpose
that is often overlooked by U.S. critics, despite the Commission's
emphasis that the Directive should not be regarded in isolation,
but rather as one important aspect of the Commission's overall
approach to the audio-visual sector. The Directive reflects a gen-
eral policy designed
to realize the same basic goals and form a coherent policy
involving, in addition to the realization of an internal market
for broadcasting, broadcast advertising and associated indus-
tries, the promotion of the Community's growing political, so-
cial and cultural identity, while simultaneously respecting and
promoting the diversity and specificity of the audio-visual cul-
tures of its Members.
7 1
69. See Wallace & Goldberg, supra note 29, at 178. Several goals enunciated in the
Directive included the establishment of guidelines to protect minors, the banning of
advertisement for tobacco products, and the establishment of a quota designed to stim-
ulate production of EC-made shows. See Directive, supra note 48, art. 3, 0.J. L 298/23,
at 26 (1989).
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. See Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal for a Council Directive concerning
broadcasting activities, COM (86) 146 Final (1986) (stating that goals are to assist, polit-
ically and financially, production and satellite distribution of European programs, cov-
ering news, politics, education, culture, entertainment, and sport). Such programs will
be of European origin and subject matter being produced by a multinational editorial
team with a European perspective in target audience, being multilingual and in trans-
mission range, being trans-frontier. These goals included promoting, via the proposed
Community financial aid scheme, European co-productions; promoting through the
present Directive, the production of national programs and the development of na-
tional audio-visual industries within Member States; ensuring by the present Directive,
an appropriate role for national productions and European co-productions as regards
the distribution of television programs in the Community; ensuring, by the enforce-
ment of the EEC Treaty and by the present Directive, the free flow of broadcasts within
the Community; to promote, by the present Directive, trade in goods and services
within the Community through broadcast advertising; ensuring, by common standards
that different incompatible technical systems for direct satellite television broadcasting
do not exist within the Community, and thus creating the common market for the
equipment to be produced for direct reception of satellite television programs; facilitat-
ing, with the help of the same Directive, the broadcasting of multilingual television
programs.
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To summarize, the main goals of the Directive, are not only to
promote a pan-European culture throughout the Member
States, but also to preserve a European culture that encompasses
and fosters the separate national cultures.72
C. The Directive
The Directive generally adopts the proposals made by the
Commission in the Green Paper by seeking to create a common
television program production and distribution market.73 Arti-
cle 2 of the Directive adopts the Commission's general recom-
mendation that broadcasting rights be extended within the
Community by requiring that Member States ensure freedom of
reception and re-transmission of television broadcasts from
other Member States.74 Article 2 reads: "Member States shall
ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict transmissions
on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member
States for reasons that fall within the fields coordinated by this
Directive."75
Article 4 of the Directive, the local content requirement, the
72. This may appear to be an oxymoron. A "European culture," however, is fluid
and dynamic and influenced by its constituent members' cultural attributes. Indeed,
the Directive specifically seeks to promote the "Community's cultural identity." See Direc-
tive, supra note 48, O.J. L 298/23 (1989) (emphasis added). The Community is com-
posed of its constituent parts. Presumably, if the European Union wanted to promote
only a single European culture to the detriment of its constituents, it would have writ-
ten "European" cultural identity and not "Community." The two-fold purpose of the
Directive can only make sense when seen in light of the promotion of a pan-European
culture and protection of its cultural constituents. Danish parliamentary member Kris-
toffersen described a "European culture" in the following way: "In my opinion, there
does exist a single European culture, but it is made up of a nuance of varieties and
differences. It is like a patchwork blanket made up of several elements, and the role of
television is to reflect this diversity." See EUR. PARt. DEB. (2-374) 51 (Feb. 14, 1989).
Whether, on a sociological level, these goals can be reconciled, is beyond the scope of
this Essay. This Essay accepts these legal premises at face value and asks how effective
the Directive has been in realizing these goals. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 317 ("This
preservation effort was deemed necessary by the Community in light of the perceived
flood of foreign broadcasting material, much of which was deemed inappropriate,
bourgeois, and culturally regressive. The programming quota was therefore seen as
essential to protect the Community viewing public from unsuitable foreign mate-
rial. . .").
73. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
74. Directive, supra note 3, art. 2, O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989).
75. Id. Article 2 allows Member States to restrict re-transmissions of broadcasts
only if the broadcast "manifestly, seriously, and gravely infringes" the safeguards in arti-
cle 22 of the Directive relating to the protection of minors.
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most controversial provision of the Directive, provides in perti-
nent part: "Member States shall ensure where practicable and by
appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works,
within the meaning of Article 6,76 a majority of their transmission
time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events,
games, advertising and tele-text services.""
The language of Article 4 left a vague standard wide open
for interpretation. Many Community members were dissatisfied
with the language "where practicable," viewing this standard as
fatally ambiguous.78 Some Member States, including Germany,
have suggested that this language means that the Directive is not
legally binding.79 This interpretation, however, is not only "le-
gally untenable," ° but is also the first time that a Community
institution, i.e., a German Council member, has attempted to
qualify a directive. Member States may not be selective in re-
garding the provisions of a directive that they adopt as binding-
the provisions of a directive being no less binding in effect "than
that of any other rule of Community law."81 A directive is bind-
ing as to the result to be achieved.8 2 Member States only enjoy
76. Article 6 has also generated much controversy, but is beyond the scope of this
Essay. Article 6 defines "European works" as, inter alia, works originating from Member
States of the Community, works originating from European third-party states party to
the Television Convention; works from other European third countries if (a) they are
made by one or more producers established in one or more of those States, (b) produc-
tion of the works is supervised and actually controlled by one or more producers estab-
lished in one or more -of those States, or (c) the contribution of co-producers of those
states to the total production costs is preponderant and the co-production is not con-
trolled by one or more producers established outside those states. Id. art. 6, OJ. L 298/
23, at 27 (1989).
77. Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(1), OJ. L 298/23, at 26-27 (1989). A discussion
of the other articles in the Directive is outside the scope of this Essay.
78. See EC Television Without Frontiers Plan Runs Aground, REUTERS AM CYCLE, June
14, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; see also EC Ministers Against Import
Limit on TV Shows, REUTERS AM CYCLE, Feb. 27, 1989, "Financial Report," available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
79. Throughout the period of debate over the Directive and its quota system, de-
scribed above, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Nether-
lands opposed legally binding minimum levels of EC content on the grounds of broad-
casting freedom. These countries were supported by Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal,
all of whom have small television industries and import a high proportion of programs.
Id. These states clearly expressed economic motivations by their initial opposition to
the quota. Their dependency on international, i.e., U.S., programming was so large
that they would not be able to fill the grid without it.
80. See Wallace & Goldberg, supra note 29, at 192.
81. See Commission v. Italy, Case 79/72, [1973] E.C.R. 667, [1973]1 C.M.L.R. 773.
82. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb 7, 1992, art. 189, OJ. C
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discretion as to the form-and means that they use to achieve the
desired goal.8" If a Member State cannot selectively choose the
directives with which it wishes to comply, then it is also "untena-
ble to suggest that a Community institution [i.e., Council or the
Commission] could be so selective."84  The Directive was
adopted in accordance with normal procedures and as such
every provision is legally binding.85
D. Post-Directive Events- "Status Quota"
On November 12, 1996, the European Parliament failed to
agree on an amendment to the Directive that would have forced
compliance by removing the "where practicable" clause with the
fifty-one percent ,European programming quota.86  At a first
reading of the legislation in February 1996, Members of Euro-
pean Parliament ("MEPs") backed proposals for strict legally-en-
forced quotas.8 7 The. MEPs, however, could not muster enough
votes under the co-decision procedure8" to alter the terms of the
Council and Commission's agreement, which said that broad-
224/1, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 693 [hereinafter EC Treaty] incorporating
changes made by TEU, supra note 21.
83. See Commission v. Italy, Case 163/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3273 [1984] 3 C.M.L.R.
169.
84. See Wallace & Goldberg, supra note 29, at 193. Granted, the Commission does
enjoy discretion under Article 169, paragraph 2, in that if pursuant to a reasoned opin-
ion a Member State has violated a treaty obligation, the Commission may bring the
matter to the European Court of Justice, if the State fails to comply with the Opinion
within a prescribed time period. The Commission enjoys discretion on whether to act
against a breach of the Treaty; however, it can not authorize a system that violates Com-
munity law. Id.
85. See id. (arguing that position of Germany and others is to be discouraged if
uniform interpretation and application of EC law is to be preserved).
86. European TV Quotas to Remain Unenforceable, SCREEN DIGEST, Dec. 1, 1996.
Although a majority of Members of European Parliament ("MEPs") who voted sup-
ported legally enforced quotas (the vote was 291-170 in favor), the vote was 23 shy of
the required vote needed to force EU Ministers to remove the "where practicable"
clause from the directive. Lamenting the vote, British Socialist Deputy Carole Tongue,
a member of the Parliament's Culture Committee, stated, "[viery powerful interests
have won today," referring to the US$6 billion trade surplus of the United States with
the EU in the audio-visual sector. See Alisa M. Kelly, European Report, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 1996.
87. Neil Buckley, TV Quota Move Fails, EUR. NEws DIG. (FIN. TIMES), Nov. 13, 1996.
88. The practical effect of the co-decision procedure is to give the Parliament
greater powers. In essence, the Parliament may reject legislation by absolute majority.
Usually, however, the Parliament will just propose amendments. See EC Treaty, supra
note 82, art. 189b, O.J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
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casting quotas would remain compulsory "where feasible,"89 thus
sticking with the Directive's toothless language. This agreement,
reached in July 1996,90 differed vastly from the European Parlia-
ment's First Reading urging strict quotas. Under the co-decision
procedure, 9' however, the MEPs would have had to get an abso-
lute majority in order to amend, which they failed to do.9 2
Nonetheless, compromise was reached and a directive
amending the 1989 Directive succeeded on June 30, 1997. De-
spite changes to the advertising rules, sponsoring, and youth
protection, the quotas were left standing.
III. "KULTURKAMPF'93
Assuming that the Directive's dual purpose of both protect-
ing and promoting a European "culture" by means of regulating
television broadcasting is proper, as the United States has recog-
89. Broadcasting: Council Embraces Commission Plan for Television Quotas, EUR. REP.,
June 15, 1996. As a side note, the issue whether to include also new broadcasting serv-
ices, specifically extending foreign-content restrictions to video-on-demand and on-line
services, was initially not resolved and continues to remain the topic of intense debate
among the Ministers. See Culture/Audiovisual Council: EU Ministers Dig in on TV Quotas
Directive, EUR. REP., Apr. 27, 1996. The Ministers attempted to resolve the video-on-
demand issue in the Common Position, though critics have argued that the agreement
shows "scant regard for technical feasibility." See, e.g., Back from the Land of Make-believe,
ECONOMIST, June 15, 1996, at 60; European Broadcasting: Advantage Mickey Mouse, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 42 [hereinafter European Broadcasting] (criticizing "guardians of
French culture" at EU level). Extending the idea of applying quotas to multi-media
services is "silly" and "won't work in an Internet, on-line environment," said one
Bertelsmann AG lobbyist. See Julie Wolf & Brian Coleman, Politics & Trade: European
Firms Fight Effort to Tighten EU's TV Quotas, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996.
90. See Common Position (EC) No. 49/96 adopted by the Council of 8 July 1996
with a view to adopting Directive 96/.. ./EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the co-ordination of certain pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action in Member States concern-
ing the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, O.J. C 264/09 (1996).
91. The common position formally agreed on in Brussels on July 8, 1996, by the
Council of the European Union had been agreed to in substance on June 18, 1996, in
Luxembourg, at the Culture and Audiovisual Council meeting. See Common Position on
Review of TV Broadcasting Directive Adopted, EUR. REP., July 10, 1996.
92. In addition to heavy lobbying on behalf of U.S. interests, one should also con-
sider the negative press associated with the Directive. THE ECONOMIST, to name just one
example, has continued to thrash the Directive, on occasion chastising supporters of
the Directive as "self-appointed guardians of European culture." See Back from the Land
of Make-believe, supra note 89, at 60. In addition, Ms. Luciana Castellina, chairwoman of
the culture committee, labeled some MEPs "cultural fascists" at times. See Michael Fo-
ley, MEPs Put TV Quota in Place to Save European "Culture, " IRISH TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at
7.
93. German term for "cultural struggle" (author's translation).
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nized in other contexts, specifically in the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement,9 4 several issues arise with regard to the effec-
tiveness of the Directive in achieving its listed goals. An initial
problem is to ascertain just why Europe cannot seem to compete
with Hollywood. Second, what is meant by a "European cul-
ture"? A culture as defined by Eurocrats in Brussels? Finally, the
issue arises as to whether the means chosen fit the ends, i.e., is
Brussels choice of regulating television broadcasting doing
enough to "promote and protect" European culture in the au-
dio-visual sector?
A. Why Can't Europe Compete-Who Is Stopping Whom?
If European culture were so important to the Europeans,
then they would likely ignore the "Beavis & Butthead" rubbish
without the need for a Directive, right? European producers
and film-makers would simply fill the cultural abyss on their own,
and enough Europeans would consume these European pro-
grams so that Hollywood could no longer compete. This Essay
argues that several factors explain why European film-makers
simply cannot compete with Hollywood.
1. Financial Dominance
Financially, the Community cannot compete with
Hollywood. In 1996, the United States enjoyed a US$4 billion
trade surplus with the Community in the film and music indus-
try.95 Hollywood productions accounted for about eighty per-
cent of the EC market for feature films in 1994, up from sixty
percent in 1984.96 The European film industry produced only
94. As debatable as this assumption may appear at first glance, especially from U.S.
critics, the reality is that the United States has already officially recognized the cultural
preservationist argument. Specifically, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement explic-
itly exempted Canadian cultural industries from its laissez-faire provisions by not plac-
ing cultural products on the same plane as general merchandise. In that treaty, the
United States "agreed to respect very strict quotas on [its] audiovisual products in Can-
ada." Moreover, in Article 2005, the United States recognized Canada's right to protect
its cultural identity. In addition, U.S. law forbids foreigners from owning a U.S. televi-
sion station. If a foreigner is determined to own a U.S. television station, then he or she
must first become a U.S. citizen. "If all this is not recognition that television films are a
separate case of cultural identity, then my name is Throttlebottom." See Roy Denman,
Television Without Frontiers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at A23.
95. See Int'l: EU Denies French Plan to Restrict American Programming in Europe,
CABLEFAX, Nov. 13, 1996.
96. See Battling for the Box, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 1994, at 52.
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500 features in 1990, down from 778 in 1970.9 7 Not even a
US$270 million subsidy to the European audio-visual industry
for the production of feature films and television programs has
seemed to help the Europeans compete. 98
But numbers alone do not adequately explain the weak Eu-
ropean film industry. Is it that Europeans simply do not support
European works, or is it that Hollywood's bombardment of pro-
grams has left Europeans feeling without alternatives?
2. The "Iron Law of Television"99
The "iron law of television" is a cultural, economic-based
theory that explains the tie among society, television, and the
free market.100 According to the "iron law of television" theory,
a television policy based on liberalization will lead invariably to a
flood of low-quality imports. 10 1 These low-quality imports drive
out higher-quality enriching domestic programs, leaving impres-
sionable viewers imprinted with U.S. values and ideals as de-
picted in the U.S. "garbage television. "102
An everyday situation validates the "iron law" theory: a tele-
vision network-especially a new one-deciding how to fill its
programming schedule is faced with the choice between com-
missioning costly domestic programs and importing U.S. prod-
ucts for a marginal fee. The decision from a cost-benefit per-
spective is quite simple, namely, the second option. Moreover,
in order to attract commercial sponsors/advertisers, program-
ming directors must decide whether to speculate on a new, do-
mestic show or to import a proven, successful U.S. program.10 3
The program director's decision is thus quite simple; budget
97. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 332. Between 1970 and 1990, European televi-
sion programming had captured less than two percent of the United States' market. Id.
98. Id.
99. For an excellent discussion of this theory, see Kaplan, supra note 1, at 335-36.
100. See id. at 335 (citing Michel Colonna D'Istria, La Television est invitee aconcilier
la qualite et l'audience, LE MONDE, July 28, 1993).
101. Id.
102. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 319 (acknowledging that there are those televi-
sion critics who would conclude that most, if not all, television programming consists of
such "video trash"); see also id. at 281 n.8.
103. The continued dismantling of government broadcasting monopolies and the
advent of new technology in cable networks and satellite TV have added to a prolifera-
tion of new channels. The programming directors of these prolific private commercial
channels, especially in smaller countries, are eager to buy U.S. television shows because
"they are cheaper to buy than to produce." See Sayeste Daser & Brett Richey, U.S. Broad-
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constraints and profit-maximization incentives force the director
to choose the cheap import. Over the long run, the cheap im-
ports will become economically more attractive than the local
product, and hence Hollywood programs will-and often does-
dominate. 
1 04
A concrete example is Sylvio Berlusconi, whose successful
method of broadcasting serves to validate the "iron law" theory.
Mr. Berlusconi successfully started a trend in Europe that the
"Television Without Frontiers" Directive later tried to reverse. In
the early 197 0s, Berlusconi searched Hollywood's old movie and
television libraries1 5 for bargains that he could bring back to
Italy. The following account summarizes the result of his trip.
[H] is Hollywood shopping spree laid the groundwork for the
solution . .. to how to fill [European] programming grids
that would attract a viewer audience and sponsors. For the
last decade, a generation of European broadcasters has
looked to Hollywood to fill the void created by the privatiza-
tion in Europe. By the mid-1980's, one of Berlusconi's com-
petitors bid $70,000 for the Italian rights to broadcast a single
episode of Dynasty.1 0'
3. Importance of Programming Diversity to Combat
"Cultural Uniformity"
A consequence of the "iron law of television" in Europe is a
lack of diversity in television programming. With over ninety
percent of EC households owning a television 10 7 and children of
today spending more time in front of the television set than at
their desks in school, television clearly plays a large role develop-
mental behavior. "[D] iversity and balance between the forms of
culture being offered are crucial to the development of a truly
casters Stand to Gain as European TV Market Grows, MARKETING NEws, July 9, 1990, vol. 24,
no. 14.
104. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 335. Cynically, the author concludes: "Thus,
traditional political pessimism ('the Russians are coming') and economic pessimism
('the Japanese are coming') is joined by cultural pessimism ('Hollywood is coming')."
Id.
105. See text accompanying notes 95-98 (explaining Hollywood's extensive librar-
ies).
106. Jonathon Weber, Turning the Volume Down: Hollywood Nervous over Possible Euro-
pean TV Quotas, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1989, pt. 4, at 1.
107. This statistic does not include Portugal. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 336 (cit-
ing Serge Regourd, LA TELEVISION DES EUROPEENS 9 (1992)).
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democratic broadcasting system."'1 8 Television viewers subtly
and subconsciously develop and alter their ways of thinking and
reacting based on what they see on the screen. 0 9
The theory of "cultural uniformity" purports that television
is used to distribute the same message to millions of people who
have in common only the fact that they are all watching and con-
suming TV. By only showing a small part of a refracted reality-
generally urban, middle-class lifestyles-television homogenizes
people, thus marginalizing languages and national cultural iden-
tities. Television disrupts and can even destroy families and per-
sonal relationships: nobody talks to anyone anymore; everyone
just watches television.
Thus, if what the viewers see is largely American products,
which reflect largely American values and beliefs, the viewers will
subtly and subconsciously develop their thinking to fit the Amer-
ican belief system. 110 The "iron law" encourages programmers
to purchase cheap American imports, consisting of "wall-to-wall
sitcoms and soaps" that create an "ostentatious, fake, parasitic,
standardized subculture of poor taste" representing "cultural re-
gression.""'
Why can't the Europeans compete? The answer lies in part
with economic realities reflected in the "iron law" and in part in
an analogy to drugs. Once hooked on the cheap, low-quality ma-
terial, viewers seem to adopt the content ("cultural uniformity
theory")." 2 The Community recognized this problem and at-
tempted to correct it by passing a quota in the Directive mandat-
108. See id. at 336.
109. Id.
110. Proponents see U.S. programs as "garbage television." See Dhooge, supra
note 31, at 319 n.224.
111. Id. at 319.
112. But see Brian L. Ross, Note, "I Love Lucy," but the European Community Doesn't:
Apparent Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast Market, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
529, 548-50 (1990) (arguing that as newer EC television stations, using programs made
in United States to fill out their schedules, obtain audience and advertisers, program-
mers will be irked to begin commissioning original European programming). Mr. Ross,
however, naively assumes that Europeans prefer European programs over U.S. pro-
grams. In 1994, the top three box-office draws in French cinemas were "The Lion
King," "Mrs. Doubtfire," and "Four Weddings and a Funeral." European Broadcasting,
supra note 89, at 42. Mr. Ross ignores the economic reality explained in the "iron law,"
namely, that the profit margin is much higher with U.S. programming. Moreover, real-
ity cuts against Mr. Ross. If his theory were correct, more television stations would pro-
mote regional development of programs. This, however, is not the case. See supra text
accompanying notes 99-106.
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ing a majority of time for European works. But just what is "Eu-
ropean" in the sense of "European culture" deserving of protec-
tion?
B. Fear of a "Euro-Culture"?
Simply stated, can Brussels define "culture" not only broad
enough to include all Member States' interests, but also concrete
and coherent enough to still make sense? Assuming that the
Community can properly effectuate the promotion of a Euro-
pean culture by means of an audio-visual regulation, the issue
arises as to who will determine just what this "culture" is?
1. Pan-European Culture Equals French, British, and
German Culture
A common fear, especially among small Member States, is
that what Brussels deems worthy of protection and promotion is
a "culture" absolutely foreign to their natural cultural identi-
ties.113 These fears appear well-grounded and based on eco-
nomic realities. Due to the high cost of producing program-
ming,14 smaller Member States experience little or no econo-
mies of scale in the television programming industry.'1 5
Moreover, because English, French, and German reflect the
three predominant languages spoken within the Community," 6
television programs produced in countries with small industries
and in secondary languages, e.g., Danish, Finnish, and Portu-
guese, cannot compete outside of their own national markets
with television programming produced in one of the "Big
Three" languages."' The end result is that the television mar-
kets of smaller Member States are overrun and dominated by
English programs produced in Britain, French programs pro-
duced in France, and German programs produced in Ger-
many. 18 Such a market stifles development of the television
programming industry within the smaller states.
Most pertinent to a discussion of pan-European culture is
113. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 325.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
115. See Mark M. Nelson & Peter Truell, Media: Some Support in EC Is Seen for TV
Quotas, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1989, at B4.
116. See supra note 17.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106.
118. See Dhooge, supra note 31, at 325.
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that the national and regional cultures, which the Directive pur-
ports to protect and promote, may be subordinated to a Pan-
European culture comprised mainly of English, French, and
German national cultures. a9 The Community would do well to
heed the advice of its smaller members not to forget the "other"
contributors to a European culture.
2. Pan-European Culture Equals Loss of Individual
Self-Determination?
During deliberations on the Green Paper,120 the Federal Re-
public of Germany and Denmark expressed deeply held con-
cerns on the broad moral issue of cultural control. Most of the
Member States viewed the quota system as a means of preventing
a tacit, deliberate loss of control over their own respective cul-
tural identities to Hollywood. The Federal Republic of Germany
and Denmark in voting against the Green Paper, however, saw a
loss of their own internal control to Brussels. Germany main-
tained that its own federal statutory scheme prohibited it from
voting for the Green Paper because federal law mandated mu-
nicipal control over cultural matters. Denmark maintained a
similar position and argued, further, that the Community could
not infringe upon control and protection of Danish culture. 121
In short, while most Member States preferred not, if given the
choice, to cede cultural authority to Hollywood or Brussels, most
would choose Brussels. Nevertheless, at least Germany and Den-
mark expressed concern about ceding control even to Brussels.
Further supporting the German and Danish positions, ar-
gue many critics, is the principle of "subsidiarity," which is sup-
posed to guide all European legislation. 122 The Treaty establish-
ing the European Community ("EC Treaty") states that the ca-
pacity to make decisions should not be transferred to a higher
level when decisions could be better made at a lower level. At-
tempts to promote a European culture via broadcast quotas
could violate constitutional protection afforded to freedom of
expression in many Member States.1 23
119. Id. at 326.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
121. See N.C.M. Peck, Transfrontier Television and Europe 1992: A Common Position?,
4 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 307 (1990).
122. Culture Caps on the Loose, AsLAN WA L ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996.
123. See id. (arguing that at least in Germany, writing broadcast regulations be-
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Despite the arguments by Germany and Denmark during
discussions of the Green Paper, both countries eventually sup-
ported the Directive.124 The idea of cultural unity is just as im-
portant as a single, stable currency representing:economic unity.
Accordingly, the importance of the Directive to the Community
seems apparent; television is the ultimate form of pan-European
communication and artistic expression. The Community, and
especially France, view culture as an arm of the state, indicative
of a nation's health and power. Thus, not only is the Commu-
nity the proper authority to promote and protect European cul-
ture, but also the Community is compelled to do so for the sake
of the Community's health and power. The Community, how-
ever, should not forget the. concerns of its smaller Member
States, who urge the Community not to forget their cultures in
formulating a broadcasting regulatory scheme designed to pro-
mote and protect a "European" culture.
C. Do the Means Fit the Ends?: A Status Report Nine Years Later
Nearly a decade has passed since the Community passed the
"Television Without Borders". Directive. One may ask the ques-
tion: how the Member States are performing under the Direc-
tive? Do the Member States broadcast a majority of their televi-
sion programs of European origin, especially considering the
Community's weak stance on the Directive?125
1. Recent Data: A Glance Through the European TV Guides
Recent data released from a European trade group indicate
that nearly seventy percent of films broadcast on eighty-eight tel-
evision channels throughout the Community were U.S.-made. 126
Thus, European programming directors are about twenty per-
cent shy of the goal established in the Directive, namely, to carry
fifty percent of the films from European origin-this assumes
longs to Lnder, or states, neither to Bonn nor Brussels). The implications of the Di-
rective could thus harm traditional federalism principles, especially. in Germany. A dis-
cussion of this point is, however, beyond the scope of this Essay.
124. Germany continually insists that the Directive is not legally binding, an inter-
pretation that flies in the face of every EC Treaty ever signed. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 78-85.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85 (explaining how EU refuses to
tighten language of Directive).
126. See Int'l: EU Denies French Plan to Restrict American Programming in Europe, supra
note 95.
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that the other thirty percent of films were all of European origin
and not, for example, of South American or Asian origin. More-
over, as of November 1996, the U.S. entertainment industry con-
tinues to enjoy a gigantic trade surplus of at least US$4 billion
with the Community in the film and music industry.127
Official numbers from the Community support the studies
described above. Though somewhat older, a 1994 Commission
study suggested that the levels of effectiveness in carrying out the
Directive vary. The Commission surveyed 148 channels. Ninety-
one channels, or a little more than sixty percent, broadcasted a
majority proportion of European works.121 In a similar study
done by the Commission in 1992, seventy of the 105 channels
surveyed, or exactly two-thirds (66.67%), broadcasted a majority
proportion of European works. 129 Thus, after slipping from
66.67% compliance to sixty percent in 1994, the numbers just
released by the independent trade group indicate a compliance
rate of nearly seventy percent, a growth in compliance by televi-
sion programming of about ten percent in two years time.
2. Are the Means Appropriate to the Ends?
Assuming, as we have for purposes of this discussion, that
culture is worthy of protection and promotion via television
broadcasting" regulations, a major issue arises as to why the Com-
munity has not done more to effectuate this goal? Why did the
Parliament fail in November 1996 to obtain the required major-
ity needed to strike the "where practicable" clause of the Direc-
tive, which renders the Directive toothless? A further question
arises as to why the Commission failed to give the Parliament
amendments that would strike the language to begin with, thus
avoiding the need for Parliament to override?
The Community need look no further than across the Atlan-
tic for a model of how to protect and promote culture via broad-
casting regulations. After all, U.S. law forbids foreigners from
owning a U.S. television station!s ° In order for a foreigner to
own a U.S. television station, he or she must first become a U.S.
citizen, reflecting at least implicit-if not explicit-disapproval
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Commission Presents Report on "Television Without Frontiers," REUTER EUR.
COMMUNTY REp., Aug. 1, 1996.
130. See supra note 94.
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of foreign influence over television broadcasts. The Directive
does not even go this far. The, Directive, however, in order to
best promote and protect European culture, should be amended
to contain similar ownership requirements as the U.S. ban on
foreign ownership.
What remains unexplained is exactly why the Community,
specifically the Commission and Council, continues to resist
strengthening the Directive's language. By refusing to remove
the largest loophole in the Directive during the most recent
amendment procedure, namely, refusing to delete the "where
practicable" language,1 3 ' the EC seems content to have a Direc-
tive that purports to promote and protect European culture
without any real enforcement mechanism-especially when la-
beled as "non-binding." Although supporters of a stronger Di-
rective blame U.S. lobbyists for stopping any further work on the
Directive, this proposition ignores the fact that the Community
initially passed the Directive despite heavy U.S. lobbying-so the
Community can, and has, stood up to rich U.S. lobbies.'1 2 More-
over, the Community shares the blame both in refusing to re-
move language that renders the Directive toothless and for fail-
ing to dispel adequately notions that the Directive is somehow
not legally binding.'3 3 In addition to urging the Community
both to strike the "where practicable" language and to dispel
more adequately the notion of a non-legally binding Directive-
which flies in the face of the EC Treaty134-this author sees as-
pects of U.S. law,'35 more specifically language from the FCC
Act's Preamble, as a model for a more comprehensive audio-vis-
ual policy that can more effectively both protect and promote
European culture.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 76-85.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85.
134. Statements by EU Vice-President Martin Bangemann and the EU's broadcast-
ing minister, Jean Dondelinger, which characterize the quota requirement as merely a
political commitment with no binding legal obligation, only serve to cheapen the mean-
ing of the EC Treaty. See supra notes 73-85.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35 (discussing U.S. law that prohibits
foreign ownership of television stations).
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IV. MODELING THE "TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS"
DIRECTIVE OFF THE FCC ACT'S PREAMBLE
The FCC Act has much to offer the "Television Without
Frontiers" Directive. The Preamble of the FCC Act reflects con-
gressional purposes similar to the Community's purposes in pass-
ing the Directive. This Part argues that the Community should
model the Directive in line with the FCC Act in order to effectu-
ate a real audio-visual policy that protects and promotes a Euro-
pean culture instead of continuing to leave dangling a Directive
that fails to establish clearly any clear and binding normative
qualities.
A. Purposes of the FCC Act: Public Policy and Function
Congress had several major purposes in mind, some func-
tional and some policy-oriented, when itenacted the FCC Act,' 6
which created the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). Broadly speaking, in enacting the FCC Act, Congress
intended to occupy the field of telecommunications at a national
level, to make available to all people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, reasonably priced communications service, governed
by one uniform regulatory scheme.1 37 The creation of the FCC
also served the broad congressional purpose of establishing an
expert agency capable of coping with the ever-changing and con-
stantly increasing problems of a booming industry. 38
The functional purpose of the FCC Act was to vest in a sin-
gle governmental agency, namely, the FCC, the power and
means to regulate the broadcasting industry in such a compre-
hensive manner as to assure uniformity and constructive growth,
i.e., a need for unity.3 9 Courts construe the FCC Act in light of
this functional purpose and the need for comprehensive regula-
tions with an eye toward avoiding the practical difficulties inher-
136. See Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
137. See Cooperative Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1511 (D.
Utah 1994).
138. See American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
139. See Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652 (D.C. Ohio
1968); see also Cawley v. City of Port Jervis, 753 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
city ordinance regulating installation of television that receive only dish antennas was
preempted by FCC regulation that warranted permanent injunction against city from
enforcing that section against homeowners).
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ent in state-by-state regulations of parts of an organic whole. 140
The underlying public policy purpose of the FCC Act is to
secure and protect the public interest."' In other words, Con-
gress designed the act to protect customers against unjust and
discriminatory services. 1 2
B. Comparison of the Directive to .the FCC Act
1. Generally
Both the Directive and the FCC Act attempt to occupy the
field of telecommunications at a larger level-the U.S. law at the
national level; the EC directive at the supranational level. Both
the Directive and the FCC Act, from a general standpoint, at-
tempt to serve their respective constituencies for the better.
Congress acted to make available to all U.S. persons a rapid, effi-
cient, reasonably priced communications service governed by
one uniform regulatory scheme. 4 3 In a similar vain, the Com-
munity acted to promote a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities services under Article 60 of the EC Treaty, a con-
tinuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability through-
out the telecommunications market, an accelerated raising of
the standard of living, and closer relations between its Member
States for the benefit of all EC citizens. 144
2. Functionally
Both the United States and the Community recognized the
problems that a telecommunication system without uniformity
would not grow constructively. In the United States, the FCC
was thus created and given power to regulate the broadcasting
industry in a manner so as to assure uniformity. Moreover, U.S.
courts read, the FCC Act with a cautious eye to prevent difficul-
ties that inevitably arise in state-by-state regulations. 145
The Community also recognized problems that numerous
Member State regulations could have on the establishment of a
140. See General Tel. Co. of Cal. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
141. See WOKO, Inc., v. FCC, 109 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
142. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
143. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
144. See Sheldon, supra note 28, at 528 (citing Article 2 of EEC Treaty as serving
purposes of Directive).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
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unified telecommunications policy and equal access to services,
as called for under Article 60 of the EC Treaty.146 Although
every Member State system exercised some form of control,
none is exactly alike. Each form of regulation differs from State
to State, as a function of how each audio-visual system was cre-
ated and developed. 47 Thus, similar to the FCC Act, the Direc-
tive serves to effectuate the realization of a unified internal
broadcasting market, which would alternatively be harmed and
made inefficient by State-by-State regulations.
3. Public Policy
Both the FCC Act and the Directive seek to secure and pro-
tect public interest. How the United States and the Community
define "public interest" for purposes of their respective legisla-
tion, however, differs. Congress valued the need to protect U.S.
citizens against unjust and discriminatory services. 148 The Com-
munity took a broader approach. The unifying of Member State
broadcast regulation served, inter alia, to promote the EC's
growing political, social, and cultural identities, while simultane-
ously respecting and promoting the diversity and specificity of
the audio-visual cultures of its Members. 149 Thus, from a public
policy perspective, while both the FCC Act and the Directive
seek to protect customers in the larger sense, the former focuses
primarily on financial protection against "unjust and discrimina-
tory services, '150 and the latter focuses not only on financial pro-
tection but also on protection against the erosion of cultural di-
versity.
C. A Call for a "European Communications Commission" ("ECC")
Though sharing the same general, functional, and public
policy purposes, the Community failed to take the next step, as
Congress did, in establishing an agency responsible for coping
146. See supra notes 21 & 23.
147. A discussion of the various States' audio-visual policy is beyond the scope of
this Essay and unnecessary for purposes of this discussion. Suffice it to say that, as
recognized the passage of the FCC Act, state-by-state regulation detracts from a unified
whole. For an excellent discussion on each Member State's audio-visual policy, see
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 295-301.
148. See supra note 137.
149. See supra notes 68-72.
150. See supra note 137.
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with the ever-changing and constantly increasing problems of
the telecommunications industry. Moreover, the Community
failed, and continues to fail, in strengthening the language of
the Directive to give the broadcasting policy the same bite as the
U.S. policy.
The Community should either create a full-time agency or
its equivalent to oversee the application of the Directive.' 51 The-
oretically, the Commission is responsible for overseeing that the
Directive is implemented in the Member States.'5 2 The Commis-
sion, however, has neglected its duty thus far, even suggesting on
occasion that the Directive is not legally binding.153 Empower-
ing an independent agency or its equivalent like the FCC, would
remove any doubt on whether the Directive is "merely political"
by institutionalizing an agency with the oversight of a unified
broadcast policy. As a result, an ECC could effectuate the pro-
tection and promotion of a European culture in a more efficient
manner.
Successful application of the Directive's policies presup-
poses a Directive with some bite. As already discussed, the Com-
munity must strike the "where practicable" language of the Di-
rective in order to effectuate the numerous purposes, not least
of which include the protection and promotion of European cul-
ture. To its credit, the Community has already taken a major
step. This goal of eliminating barriers between Member States-
the "functional" objective was accomplished by recognizing one
"European license" sufficient in all Member States.' 54 The Di-
rective specifically allows EC broadcasters, who obtain one li-
cense from any Member State, to broadcast thereafter through-
out the European Union without having to obtain a separate li-
cense from individual nations in which the broadcasters seek to
151. Concerns that such an agency would somehow violate the principal of sub-
sidiarity are misplaced. For a brief discussion of subsidiarity, see supra text accompany
ing notes 122-26 (explaining that Maastricht Treaty states that capacity to make deci-
sions should not be transferred to higher level when decisions could be better made at
lower level). Because we are talking about a European culture here, decisions must be
made from a supranational level. See supra text accompanying 125. The need for a
cultural unity is as important as the need for economic unity. One agency is more
effective in effectuating a cultural unity/harmony via broadcasting regulations than 15
national agencies.
152. See EEC Treaty, supra note 21.
153. See supra notes 73-85.
154. See Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2), O.J. L 298/23, at 26 (1989).
2021
2022 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1991
broadcast.155 The Community must now take a further step in
completing its vision of a unified, efficient broadcasting policy
that protects and promotes European culture. The establish-
ment of an ECC would effectuate all the purposes espoused by
the Directive in a cohesive, unified, efficient institution.
V. CONCLUSION
The "Television Without Frontiers" Directive-even as
amended-reflects a long-standing tradition in Europe to regu-
late the power of the audio-visual industry. The Directive repre-
sents the Community's first attempt, however, to harmonize the
audio-visual industry comprehensively via broadcast regulations
that call for a majority of the programming to be of European
origin. A major dual-purpose in enacting this Directive was both
to promote and protect a European culture. The means chosen,
namely broadcast regulations, appear at first glance to serve as
effective tools in effectuating this dual-purpose. The Commu-
nity, however, should "sharpen" these tools in order to best serve
the dual-purpose.
As an initial matter, the Community must not forget to con-
sider the concerns of its smaller Member States, who fear not
only a lack of respect, but also a loss of sovereignty to Brussels.
The former point refers to the Community's tendency to con-
sider "European" culture as French, English, and German. The
latter point flows from the former: by failing to acknowledge
appropriately contributions by smaller states to a "European cul-
ture" in the formulation of broadcasting laws designed to further
that "culture," the smaller states have ceded legal control over
broadcasting to Brussels without having any say on how to pro-
tect their cultures.
Second, the Community ought to implement similar televi-
sion ownership requirements as the United States. The Directive
should be amended to require EC citizen status as a requirement
for ownership of television stations.
Third, and most important to the effective functioning of
the Community, is the need to dispel any notions that the Direc-
tive is somehow non-binding. Major officials of the Community
155. Id. "Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict
transmission on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member States for
reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive." Id.
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continue not only to cheapen the meaning of the Directive, but
also to contravene well-established EC law-as reflected, inter
alia, in the Art. 189 of the EEC Treaty-by suggesting that the
quota provision is non-binding on Member States. The Commu-
nity could best serve the valid and laudable end of promoting a
European culture both by refraining from statements that the
Directive does not bind the Member States and by tightening the
Directive's language by removing Article 6's "where practicable"
clause.
Finally, after making the needed changes to the Directive,
the Community should establish an ECC modeled after the pur-
poses behind the establishment of the FCC in order to institu-
tionalize and effectuate the protection and promotion of a Euro-
pean culture in the audio-visual industry.
